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Madison in Post-9/11 Cyberspace:
Applying Federalist No. 10 to the Online Battle
for “Hearts and Minds”
Dawinder S. Sidhu*
INTRODUCTION
The creation of the American experiment in government may be
considered by Americans -- from the founding era to the present day -- to be a
particularly special, if not divinely ordained, moment in the history of mankind. 1
George Washington himself observed that “the foundation of our Empire was not
laid in a gloomy age of Ignorance and Suspicion, but at an Epoch when the rights
of mankind were better understood and more clearly defined, than at any former
period.”2 The citizens of the young nation, he added, are “to be considered the
Actors on a most conspicuous Theatre, which seems to be peculiarly designated
by Providence for the display of human greatness and felicity.” 3 The
establishment of an independent republic was by no means a foregone conclusion,
but was a rather improbable outcome that even Washington acknowledged was a
“standing miracle.”4
In this seemingly inspired and undoubtedly precarious time, the leaders of
the nation seized upon their destiny and overcame practical struggles to prepare a
Constitution that succinctly defines the limited powers of the government and the
rights of the people to whom all remaining power is reserved. For its part, the
1
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See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1400-1404 (2006) (describing
the “public reverence” for the Constitution and the Framers).
2
Joseph J. Ellis, AMERICAN CREATION 4 (2007).
3
Id. at 5.
4
Id. at 8.
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Constitution is regarded as “the best political document ever made,” in the words
of respected jurist Learned Hand.5 For their part, the Framers of the Constitution
were quickly -- and continue to be -- lionized. For example, Alex de Tocqueville,
in his seminal study of the American Constitution, referred to them as “the men of
greatest intelligence and noblest character ever to have appeared in the New
World.”6
The Framers are thought to embody the best in American thought and
character. They are, in other words, the standard by which future generations of
American public figures aspire towards, both in terms of the quality of their ideas
and the temperament by which they are to conduct themselves when in service of
the people. Thomas Jefferson, for example, is likened to a “sensitive reflector,
through several generations,” of American identity.7
It should therefore come as no surprise that, in order to remain faithful to
our principles and values, and given our affection and reverence for the Framers,
we call upon them to help us resolve our society’s most vexing problems. Doing
so helps us determine whether the course of action we are proposing comports
with what is our true American selves. “If Jefferson was wrong, America is
wrong. If America is right, Jefferson was right.”8 Indeed, the courts have
invoked the Framers in a number of contentious national issues, from determining
the content of the Second Amendment9 and the permissibility of religious displays

5

Learned Hand, Morals in Public Life, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 251-52 (Irving Dillard ed., 1960).
Alex de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (J. Mayer ed. 1969).
7
Merrill Peterson, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND vii (1960).
8
Id. at 234. The subject of this Article, James Madison, was no slouch either. See, e.g., Gordon
S. Wood, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 156 (2006) (“Since
Madison was central to the creation of the United States Constitution . . . he and his ideas have
come to bear an exceptional responsibility for the character of American politics and society. . . .
According to many political theorists, to understand Madison is to understand American
politics.”).
6

9
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008) (citing to Jefferson and
Madison in interpreting the meaning of a “well-regulated militia”).
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on public grounds10, to the constitutionality of criminal sentencing11 and whether a
state may maintain an all-male public military academy12.
To be sure, there are at least a few problems with the approach of drawing
upon the Framers for guidance with respect to the issues of the day. First, the
Framers did not reach consensus on all matters. The famous rivalry between the
Alexander Hamilton, a staunch nationalist from New York who favored a strong
federal banking system and central government, and Jefferson, a republican from
Virginia who preferred an agrarian lifestyle and trusted the people to do right by
American society, perhaps best illustrates the fact that the Framers themselves
were not in lockstep as to the makeup of the American government. 13 Second, the
essence of the American constitutional design was not to provide definitive
responses to all circumstances of American life, but rather set in motion a
peaceful process by which those answers could be developed by way of
democratic participation.14 The Constitution, historian Joseph Ellis noted, “did
not resolve the long-standing political disagreements that existed,” but instead
established a “context with which they could be argued out.”15 The Constitution,
in short, did not offer substantive formalisms applicable to all situations, but
rather supplied the procedural structure within which such answers could be
formulated.16
10

See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878 (2005)
(citing to Jefferson, Madison, and Adams in addressing the principle of neutrality for
Establishment Clause purposes).
11
See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (citing to Jefferson and Adams in the
context of determining the importance of the right to a jury trial in our constitutional structure).
12
See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 n.5 (1996) (citing to Jefferson for his view on the
role of women in public affairs).
13
See, e.g., Wood, Revolutionary Characters at 136-38 (describing the Republicans’ opposition,
led by Jefferson’s protégé Madison, against Hamilton’s aggressive Federalist program).
14
See Charles J. Cooper et al., Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Roles of Congress, the
President, and the Courts: What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
165, 188-89 (1988) (“[T]he Constitution . . . is a short, clear, general outline of the structure and
principle of government” and “a most appropriate starting place for the evolution of a body of
law.” It “leaves ample room for growth and adaptation as its general principles are applied to the
necessities of governance in a constantly changing world.”).
15
Joseph J. Ellis, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 143 (1996).
16
The Framers’ punting of the slavery issue is perhaps most representative of the fact that they did
not divine definitive resolutions to all pressing social issues. As President Barack Obama noted,
slavery “divided the colonies and brought the convention to a stalemate until the founders chose to
allow the slave trade to continue for at least twenty more years, and to leave any final resolution to
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Third, and relatedly, though the Framers’ views are invoked in the context
of contemporary issues, it is impossible for the Framers to have foreseen the
scientific advancements and technological conveniences which have come to
define the modern Information Age.17 Perhaps the most glaring example of a
feature of present Americana that would have eluded the wide imagination of the
Framers is the advent of the Internet -- a global network that enables information
of many formats to be transmitted from one corner of the globe to another in
seconds and with the simple clicks of a mouse or strokes of a keyboard.18
These cautionary observations, however significant, do not dissipate the
interest in determining how the Framers of the nation may have resolved legal
disputes that arise in the modern day. Constitutional law scholar Erwin
Chemerinsky notes, “Justices continue to invoke the framers’ views as
authoritative,” not just as instructional or informative.19 Indeed, according to one
school of interpretive judicial philosophy, commonly referred to as originalism,
the “intentions of the framers should be binding on contemporary interpreters of
the Constitution.”20
future generations.” Barack Obama’s Speech on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/us/politics/18text-obama.html (last visited: Nov. 17, 2009).
17
See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Keeping Secrets, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2002) (“The
Framers . . . could not have imagined computers or the system that allows computers to
communicate with each other, the Internet.”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997)
(describing the Internet as “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication.”) (citation omitted).
18
See, e.g., 59 Am. Jur. Internet Presence as a Basis for Personal Jurisdiction § 8 (2007) (defining
the Internet as “an ever-changing global agglomeration of linked computer networks. Once a
computer is linked to the Internet, it can quickly, and at minimal expense, communicate and
exchange data and programming with nearly every other computer linked to the Internet.”);
Winston P. Lloyd, What’s the Frequency Uncle Sam?: Will the Government Hold Up the
Information Superhighway in the Name of Competition?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 233, 233 (1995)
(defining the Internet as “a vast system of interconnect networks operating under common
protocols, yet operating independently and without any centralized authority.”).
19
Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory
Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
20
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 886
(1985); see also Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 22 (1997) (“The text is the law, and it
is the text that must be observed”); Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Miers, WALL ST. J., Oct.
19, 2005, at A12 (writing that orginalism “means that the judge must discern from the relevant
materials . . . the principles the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting . . . [and] apply
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Invoking the Framers in an effort to illuminate or work through twentyfirst century legal questions is precisely what law professor and Volokh
conspirator21 David G. Post did in his creative book, In Search of Jefferson’s
Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace.22 Specifically, Post addressed how
Jefferson’s perspectives on the roles of the government and the people, and
individual rights (e.g., speech and property rights), may inform and advance the
existing conversation on how the Internet should be regulated.23
As Post notes, governance of the Internet and of the “New World” were
affected by an identical problem -- rapid expansion.24 Such growth in the colonies
was something the early leaders of the nation were compelled to make sense of.
Post focused on Jefferson; however it is James Madison who may have penned
the most insightful treatise on governance in an expansive territory. While the
traditional thinking dictated that a large society made effective governance more
difficult, to Madison an extended republic was an advantage -- the varying
factions in the States would balance each other out in that no one large faction
would be permitted to dominate the rest, whereas in a smaller republic such
oppression would be more likely to result.25 Similarly, the constituents would
elect representatives who reflected the broader views of the people, and as such
fringe candidates unwilling to compromise would be unable to garner sufficient
electoral support and would be marginalized.26 These concepts, captured in
Federalist No. 10, are considered to be Madison’s greatest contribution to the
United States and to intellectual history.27
those principles to unforeseen circumstances.”).
21
Post is a regular contributor to the popular legal affairs web-log, The Volokh Conspiracy. It is
available at: http://www.volokh.com.
22
David G. Post, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE (2009).
23
See id. at 17-18 (“I want to put Jefferson’s ideas to work. I want to use them to help think about
cyberspace. . . . The goal is to explore, to try and understand something about the way life
proceeds there, so that we can begin the process of imagining, and perhaps bringing them into
being, the new structures and institutions that can help to govern it wisely and well.”).
24
See id. at 31-46 (describing the growth of both the Internet and the young nation); Reno, 521
U.S. at 850 (“The Internet has experienced extraordinary growth.”) (internal quotes and citation
omitted).
25
See footnotes 87-89 and accompanying text, infra.
26
See footnote 86 and accompanying text, infra.
27
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 378 (1992)
(calling Federalist No. 10 “perhaps the greatest document of political theory penned on this side
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If these writings on the expansive and expanding nation were so useful,
the question becomes whether they can be applied with meaningful force to the
Internet, another widening entity with wholesome and not so attractive members?
The purpose of this Article is to explore the application of Madison’s political
theory to the Internet as it exists in the post-9/11 context. It will be my central
contention that Madison’s views are not only relevant to the Internet, but can be
of significant assistance to the American prosecution of its campaign against
transnational terrorism.
In particular: Part I will provide an overview of the concept of factions as
contemplated by Madison in Federalist No. 10. Part II will note that factions are
present online, including a terrorist faction that not only spreads its doctrinal
views, but also communicates operational directives by way of the Internet. As
Madison suggests that factions can effectively check each other, this Part will
argue that the United States may be able to robustly compete with and diffuse the
appeal of the terrorists’ views by forging an online faction that disseminates
messages that attract readers to the United States and that therefore counteracts
any rhetorical pull of the online messages of the terrorists. This part will also
discuss ways in which social and legal norms can support this uniquely American
online faction.
Applying Madisonian political philosophy to the Internet is not an
academic exercise or thought experiment. The American conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan are ongoing and success in both theatres is proving elusive. 28 This
Article offers an idea that may improve the American image abroad and its ability
to deaden the appeal of adverse ideological speech. Any proposals that may
enhance, however modestly, the American prospects for fulfilling our goals
overseas should be entertained. Relatedly, it is clear that military might and
economic coercion are insufficient tools to prevail against the will of the
terrorists.29 The United States therefore must turn to an alternative to arms and
of the Atlantic.”); see also Wood, Revolutionary Characters at 161 (“Federalist No. 10 has
become the most famous document in the history of American political thought.”).
28
See footnotes 100-03 and accompanying text, infra.
29
See, e.g., Lindsey J. Borg, Communicating With Intent: The Department of Defense and
Strategic Communication, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University vii, Feb.
2008, available at: http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/borg/borg-i08-1.pdf. (“Increasingly, conflict
takes place in a population’s cognitive space, making sheer military might a lesser priority for
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sanctions, “soft power,” which consists of attaining beneficial foreign policy
results by way of attraction.30 Winning hearts and minds through online speech
would be an aspect of this other form of power.
Moreover, the terrorist elements are using the Internet, quite successfully,
to propagate their messages and coordinate attacks.31 The focus of existing
scholarship has addressed, sensibly in response, the need to thwart the terrorist
factions through disabling their access to and use of the Internet.32 Attention has
not been paid, however, to how we can battle the terrorists online through speech,
rather than through disruption or surveillance. To the extent that the terrorist
faction cannot be brought down and thus remains in cyberspace, it would be
prudent to address how the Americans can “fight” in that same space.33
Finally, there is little doubt that the Internet is ubiquitous and the
online/mobile media is becoming an integral, seamless part of our every day lives,
from shopping and obtaining information to expressing opinions and sharing
pictures.34 Its reach is outpacing our ability to decide how issues arising in
victory in the Information Age. Use of the nation’s hard power is inadequate as the sole — or even
primary — means to address an insurgency.”).
30
See, e.g., id. (“Instead, national decision makers must create a synergistic approach that
emphasizes the country’s soft power capabilities while drawing on complementary efforts of its
hard power if necessary.”). For a discussion of the meaning of “soft power,” please see footnotes
126-27 and accompanying text, infra.
31
See footnotes 104-112 and accompanying text, infra.
32
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother
that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 636 (2003) (arguing that because “terrorists groups such as AlQaeda were known to favor the latest Internet technologies to communicate with each other,”
Internet surveillance laws could be updated to “assist law enforcement in terrorism-related
cases.”);
33
“[T]he Internet has now become a new battleground for terrorists like al-Qaeda.” Fletcher N.
Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: Assessing the Constitutionality of the National
Security Agency’s Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 429, 433 n.26 (2006).
34
See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 145 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“The ubiquitous presence of
the internet and the all-encompassing nature of the information it contains are too obvious to
require extensive citation or discussion.”); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2nd Cir.
2001) (“Computers and Internet access have become virtually indispensable in the modern world
of communications and information gathering.”); see also Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open
Access Debate: The Case for a Wholesale Market, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 656 (2000) (“The
stage is set for the Internet to become a ubiquitous information and communications system that
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cyberspace should be adjudicated.35 In a search for persuasive instruments to help
steer policymakers and others through this new terrain, it would be eminently
reasonable to consult the Framers for guidance. It is hoped that Post’s book and
similar efforts will help serve as triggers for other scholarship that will draw a
nexus between the Framers and cyberspace issues.36 In the universe of possible
resources, we could do a lot worse.
For these reasons, and those that follow, it is hoped that the American
legal and political communities will embrace Madison’s vision of an extended
republic as well as the proposal that an online American faction can frustrate or
perhaps even neutralize harmful ones in cyberspace.

delivers high-quality real-time audio, video and information services to consumers throughout the
United States and is the backbone for everyday commercial transactions.”).
35
See Rodney A. Smolla, The Life of the Mind and a Life of Meaning: Reflections on Fahrenheit
451, 107 MICH. L. REV. 895, 909 (2009) (“While the internet is not a lawless space, it is a space in
which law is always several steps behind invention.”); Noam Cohen, In Britain, Web Leaves
Courts Playing Catch-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/technology/internet/30link.html (“Technology is way ahead
of the law, and the law is limping along trying to make sense of it.”).
36
It is worth noting that others have sought to use the Framers’ views as guides for examining
current legal issues. See, e.g., Christine G. Heslinga, Note, The Founders Go On-line: An
Original Intent Solution to a Jurisdictional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 247 (2000). No
article, however, has discussed how Madison’s Federalist No. 10 applies to cyberspace, let alone
to cyberspace as an instrument of diplomacy in the specialized post-9/11 climate.
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I. MADISON AND THE EXPANSIVE REPUBLIC
The political minds of early America were confronted with a confluence
of two realities -- the nation was expanding while human nature dictated that the
people and their leaders will be interested in only their regional and particular
affairs. In other words, the Framers were forced to figure out how it may be
possible to keep the United States together and keep it from splitting apart into a
collection of city-states. This section discusses these problems and Madison’s
ingenious solution.
1. The Practical and Theoretical Problems
Just as users and networks continue to expand the Internet, settlers and
speculators of the eighteenth century moved out into the frontier, enlarging the
budding nation in terms of population and territorial size.37 In 1790, the year of
the first officially recorded census, America held 3,929,214 individuals, slaves
included.38 A decade later, it had 5,308,483 people total, an increase of 26%.39 In
1810, during Madison’s presidency, the population stood at 7,239,881, an
increase of 26% over 1800 levels and 45% over 1790 levels.40 Similarly, in 1790
the American borders covered an area of 891,364 square miles, whereas in 1810 it
effectively doubled to 1,722,685.41 In other words, the leaders of the New World
were charged with handling a people populating at an exponential rate42 in an area
significantly larger than Great Britain (93,788 square miles)43, the land from
which the Americans escaped.
While the people were increasing in number and occupying new territories
within the several states, the interests of the people and their political
37

See, e.g., Post, at 44 (“The Internet, like [colonial] Virginia, has been growing geometrically, at
a rate of just under 5 percent a month (about 80 percent per year), yielding an ‘average doubling
time’ of about fourteen months.”) (emphasis omitted).
38
Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density: 1790 to 1990, United States
Census, available at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-2.pdf.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See Post at 38-41 (discussing the estimates as to the growth rate of colonial Virginia).
43
United Kingdom Information and History, National Geographic, available at:
http://travel.nationalgeographic.com/places/countries/country_unitedkingdom.html (last visited:
Nov. 18, 2009).
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representatives did not commensurately expand -- the concerns of the people and
their representatives remained local. “Americans had begun the Revolution by
assuming that the people were a homogeneous entity in society set against the
rulers.”44 With experience, however, it became clear that “the people” possessed,
in Hamilton’s words, a “strong predilection in favor of local objects.”45
As a result, the states protected their particular interests when dealing with
other states. New York, for example, was perceived to be biased towards the
merchants and bankers, whereas Virginia the farmers and tobacco trade.46 And,
within the states themselves, districts would guard their particular interests when
dealing with other districts. For example, those in upstate New York were
unlikely to share the same interests as those in Manhattan.47
Madison, who served in the federal constitutional convention and in the
Virginia legislature48, was acutely aware of this phenomenon. As a delegate to the
constitutional convention, he felt that the “selfish states threatened the survival of
the confederation” as well as the American experiment in government itself. 49
“Internally, the states exhibited the same selfishness and pettiness they displayed
on the national scale.”50 What Madison found during his in the Virginia legislature
was “not selfless patriots, but narrow-minded politicians, concerned mainly with
log rolling, deal making, and satisfying their local constituencies.”51 To Madison,
the legislators “seemed parochial, illiberal, small-minded, and most of them
seemed to have only ‘a particular interest to serve.’”52 The state of politics was
44

Gordon S. Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 at 606 (1998).
Federalist No. 15 (Hamilton).
46
See Christian C. Day, Partner to Plutocrat: The Separation of Ownership from Management in
Emerging Capital Markets – 19th Century Industrial America, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 525, 535-36
(2004).
47
See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1008 (2007) (commenting on this possibility).
48
See The James Madison Timeline 1774-1783, The Library of Congress, available at:
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/mjmtime2.html; The James Madison
Timeline 1784-1807, The Library of Congress, available at:
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/mjmtime3.html (noting Madison’s
service at the federal and state levels).
49
Edward J. Larson, Building a Nation from Thirteen States: The Constitutional Convention and
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 9 (2005).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Wood, Revolutionary Characters at 148 (citation omitted).
45
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such that legislators “were reluctant to do anything that might appear unpopular”
and they pandered to “prevailing sentiments” even if these sentiments did not
advance the greater good.53
How, then, would the United States, work as a cohesive political entity?
The Framers struggled with how it may be possible to govern people with
increasingly different and regional interests. Conventional political wisdom held
that the greater these interests, the more difficult it will be for a centralized
government to rule effectively and the more likely that the majority will oppress
the minority. Montesquieu, a political luminary whom the Framers studied, best
explained this theory:
In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and
consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable
to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he
soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by
oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to
grandeur on the ruins of his country.
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand,
private voices; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on
accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more
obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every
citizen; abuses have less extent[.]54
More to the point, “It is natural for a republic to have only a small
territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist,” he wrote.55 In short, Montesquieu
“believed that in larger republics impartial dedication to the common good was
less likely than in smaller ones”56 and that “large republics to be the most likely
candidates for democratic tyranny.”57
53

Id.
Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. VIII, ch. 16 (1752).
55
Id.
56
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1133 (2004).
57
Norman R. Williams II, Note, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial
Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 971 (1994). See Post at 111 n.3, 112 (describing Montesquieu’s
views with respect to governance of small communities).
54
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A large, growing nation was not only problematic in terms of theory, but it
in practice as well. For example, the expansion complicated, if not rendered
impossible, any workable situation in which the United States could honor the
natives’ sovereign borders by migrating elsewhere -- there were just too many
settlers and no ability to patrol those borders.58 Disappointed that respect for the
native lands could not be practically maintained, Washington is quoted as saying,
“scarcely anything short of a Chinese wall will restrain the Land jobbers and the
encroachment of settlers upon the Indian Country.”59
As it turns out, Madison would offer an innovative and brilliant solution to
the realities of a growing republic seemingly mindful only of local concerns. In
doing so, “Madison reversed the conventional logic” and “essentially turned a
core assumption” that large republic’s were unfit for sustainable governance “on
its head.”60
2. The Solution: Federalist No. 10
In Federalist No. 10, Madison proposed how the United States may persist
despite the dominant view that local squabbling and populist politics would
cripple large governments. First, the concessions -- he accepted as true the
“[c]omplaints . . . that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority.”61 These conflicts have “divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to
vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.”62 The
conflicts may be premised on less than important grounds -- “[s]o strong is this
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent
conflicts.”63
58

See Ellis, AMERICAN CREATION at 159 (“polic[ing] the borders . . . was like stopping a flood with a
bucket of sponges.”).
59
Id. (citation omitted).
60
Wood, Revolutionary Characters at 105-06.
61
Federalist No. 10.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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Madison also accepted that the human condition is such that we will hold
interests that are particular to our circumstances. For example, the merchant will
support low taxes on imports or exports, the religious man will resist restrictions
on freedoms of expression, and beneficiary of free labor will protect the
institution of slavery, etc.64 The tendency to hold such particular interests is,
according to Madison, “sown in the nature of man.”65
Shared interests that result from this tendency is what Madison meant by
“faction,” the concept at the heart of his political theory.66 Madison specifically
defined “faction” as “a number of citizens . . . who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”67
Second, if factions are part of human nature and if there is evidence that
they had proved injurious to the general good, can we eliminate their impact on
society? Madison disposed of two possible remedies. One method of removing
factions would be “destroying” liberty, as factions would not exist without
liberty.68 This, however, would be “unwise” and “worse than the disease” -because liberty gives rise to faction and is “essential to political life,” doing away
with liberty would eliminate not only faction but a necessary element of civilized
society.69
The other method would be to “giv[e] to every citizen the same opinions,
the same passions, and the same interests.”70 In other words, homogeneous
interests would not lead to disparate factions and partisan domestic affairs. This,
64

See id. (“Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests
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however, would be impractical -- because “the reason of man continues fallible,”
there exists “diversity in the faculties of men,” and men are subject to different
circumstances, it will be impossible for all men to have identical opinions. 71 In
short, neither the causes (liberty) nor the effects (varying opinions) of factions can
be eliminated.
Third, as factions are an inevitable part of the American political
community, the question becomes whether their effects can be justly mediated.
To address this, Madison differentiated between a “pure democracy,” which is
characterized as direct government by the people72, and a “republic,” which is
government by elected representatives of the people.73 Madison expressed
skepticism that, in a “pure democracy,” the legislators, as a supervisory agent,
would be able to balance competing factions -- the legislators themselves may
belong to the factions, the faction with the most legislative support (the majority)
would invariably prevail.74 The result would be the oppression of the minority. 75
For example, with respect to taxes, Madison writes that, “Every shilling with
which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own
pockets.”76 While, at least in theory, “enlightened” legislators could impartially
balance competing factions, in practice such legislators could not be counted upon
to reliably intercede in a “pure democracy.77
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Fourth, while in a “pure democracy” the majority faction would rule and
have opportunity to oppress all others,78 in a “republican” form of government,
however, the ability of a single faction to oppress others would diminish and the
commensurate ability of “enlightened,” balanced leaders to emerge would
increase.79 In particular: with respect to a minority faction, the majority factions
would “defeat its sinister views by regular vote.”80 With respect to a majority
faction, having to put their views to a vote would compel the majority to
“sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of
other citizens.”81 In other words, in order to win votes and rule82, candidates
would be forced to abandon any interest in oppressing the minority-interest voters
and advance an agenda of broader appeal in order to garner the political support
of others.83 The voting public at large would be the best judge of the “true interest
of their country” and what should be set aside as “temporary or partial
considerations.”84 In sum, it is more likely that the views pronounced by the
“representatives of the people . . . will be more consonant to the public good than
if pronounced by the people themselves[.]”85
Fifth, and the pièce de résistance of Federalist No. 10, is Madison’s
treatment of the widening republic. According to Madison, “the greater number
of citizens, and greater sphere of country,” the less likely it will be that oppressive
factions will rule. In particular, with respect to the greater number of citizens, the
more people that vote, the increased chances that improper passions and motives
78
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will be filtered to the fringe and the increased chances that an “enlightened”
representative will arise from the election process:
[A]s each representative will be chosen by a greater number of
citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more
difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the
vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the
suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to
centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most
diffusive and established characters.86
With respect to the greater sphere, in a small society it will be more likely
that the people will have the same interests and that a strong majority without
meaningful opposition will result; the minority thus has a limited ability to check
candidates for office. A large society, however, contains more interests and
passions, and thus there are a greater number of factions to check any possible
invidious passions of prospective representatives:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass
within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and
execute their plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have
a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a
common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.87
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In light of this, Madison concludes that, contrary to Montesquieu’s
prevailing theory, a large society operated by republican principles is preferable to
a smaller one.88 In other words, Montesquieu’s “law” regarding scale was
wrong.89
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See Federalist No. 10 (“it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a
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II. MADISON AND TODAY’S INTERNET
This section applies Madison’s views on factions in an expansive republic
to the Internet, which also contains factions and is growing as a communications
medium, in order to fashion a tool of diplomacy in the current war on
transnational terrorism.
1. General Application of Federalist No. 10 to the Internet
There can be little doubt that factions -- those with interests and passions
particular to their own circumstances and predilections -- exist with respect to the
Internet. Perhaps one of the most obvious examples is the tension between major
record labels -- which seek to safeguard copyrighted works from unauthorized
downloading -- and the user music community -- which seeks to harness the
power of the Internet to share music files without restriction and for minimal if
not no cost.90 Other factions are readily identifiable as well, including those who
find certain sexual imagery to be contrary to good taste and law, and those who
believe such images are protected by free speech considerations,91 online
merchants who wish to peddle their goods to other states online and those who
wish to protect home merchants from the competition of out-of-state online
retailers92, and those who voice different political opinions in cyberspace93.
As factions are on the World Wide Web, the factual predicate exists for
the application of Federalist No. 10, the essence of which is the concept of
90

See generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004);
Timothy James Ryan, Note, Infringement.com: RIAA v. Napster and the War Against Online
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factions, to the Internet. Madison’s first point, that factious behavior exists,
resonates with the online sphere, as demonstrated by the examples of factions
enumerated above. Madison’s second point also works well with the Internet -eliminating the liberty to use the Internet would be far worse than the bickering
that takes place with respect to the online medium and it would be beyond
impracticable to require each Internet user to possess and/or communicate the
same ideas online.
The third and fourth points concern whether the people or a delegated
subset of people should be entrusted with defining and implementing applicable
rules of conduct.94 It would appear that the existence of factions and Madison’s
distrust of the people to properly coordinate their affairs would suggest his
preference for a representative entity to devise and administer Internet rules.95 For
purposes of this Article96, it is sufficient to accept the fact that the Internet, at
94

Whether and to what extent a supervisory body should or will emerge is an open question
among commentators. See Justin Graham, Ashley Johnson, Emilio Mena and Neil Wolitzer,
Cybersquatting: The Latest Challenge in Federal Trademark Protection, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH.
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remain a cooperative association with no centralized control by any individual or government
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there would be sufficient factious behavior in his mind to warrant a ruling body.
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present, is unregulated by a centralized authority, allowing users to enter and exit
the network at will.97
The fifth point -- that the extended sphere makes it less probable that a
certain faction will be able to dominate -- applies to the Internet as well. There is
little doubt that the Internet is an extended, and growing, entity.98 The
discriminatory properties of territorial governance, in which the broad base of
people select only the best and relegate to the fringe the disfavored, is present on
the Internet as well. For example, the prevailing Internet protocols generally are
those that attain positive feedback from the users themselves, which lead these
protocols to grow and to command adherence, whereas those which the users
reject are discarded or ignored.99
Federalist No. 10 can be applied to the Internet. Another, far more
important issue is how it can be applied in a useful, helpful fashion in the battle
against terrorists.
2. The Post-9/11 Context
Afghanistan and Iraq are the focal points of the American campaign
against transnational terrorism. The American foreign policy goals in both of
these regions are becoming increasingly elusive. The condition in Afghanistan,
for example, is “deteriorating,” according to Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.100 He added, “Afghanistan is very vulnerable, in terms
of Taliban and extremists taking over again, and I don’t think that threat’s going
to go away.”101 Moreover, American and Iraqi officials are both in agreement that
al Qaeda is “regaining strength” in Iraq.102 Despite the continuing American
96
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presence in Iraq and troop surges, al Qaeda remains “capable of conducting
singular high-profile attacks,” according to General Ray Odierno, the top U.S.
commander in Iraq.103
Of most relevance here is that the terrorists are online. It is undisputed
that one of the players in cyberspace is terrorist elements 104 and that the Internet
was specifically used by al Qaeda in the course of executing the attacks of 9/11.105
According to some government experts, “terrorists are at the threshold of using
the Internet as a direct instrument of bloodshed.”106
In particular, al Qaeda has used the Internet for multiple purposes,
including “to train and recruit adherents, reestablish damaged cells, obtain
financing, and communicate operational information.”107 With respect to training,
al Qaeda uses the Internet in order to furnish instructions on the “cleaning and
care of weapons, physical training for its foot soldiers, and the way to set up a
safe house, as well as how to stage a kidnapping,” among other activities.108 As to
recruitment, the Internet “helps Islamist terrorists unify and motivate their zealous
adherents.”109 It also has used the Internet for restorative reasons, to “replace their
dismantled training camps, reconnect their weakened organization, and
reconstitute their leadership.”110 The Internet is a virtual cash cow for al Qaeda,
as it solicits money online and engages in identity and credit card theft online, for
103
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example, to raise funds.111 Most relevant, al Qaeda is on the Internet in order to
disseminate its “virulent ideology” and messages of jihad.112
What can we do about this?
3. The Proposal
Taking a cue from Madison, to neutralize the terrorists that operate on the
Internet, the United States should itself enter the Internet as a robust faction. If it
is the case that al Qaeda uses the Internet as a means of propagating its views, it
would only make sense to be an active participant in the online marketplace of
ideas and to spread information on the United States that reflects the best of the
American constitutional structure, egalitarian principles and individual rights, and
its demonstrated efforts to prosecute the current war in a manner consistent with
that structure and those ideals. The United States should, in other words, make an
appeal to conscience in cyberspace.
The United States government has recognized that terrorists are on the
Internet. This understanding took time, to be sure. In May of 2002, FBI Director
Robert S. Mueller testified that, “As best we can determine, the actual hijackers
had no computers, no laptops, no storage media of any kind.”113 In truth, al Qaeda
had been using the Internet for “theological and paramilitary training” by in
1990’s114 and, as noted above, used in the course of the 9/11 attacks.115
Today, the government has entered cyberspace in order to work against al
Qaeda’s utilization of the Internet as a terrorist tool. For example, it conducts
electronic surveillance to detect messages of attacks, investigate the whereabouts
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of al Qaeda operatives and cells, and safeguard attacks on the Internet itself.116
But it does not have a meaningful, coherent substantive voice on the Internet that
is designed to combat the terrorist dogma being disseminated throughout
cyberspace. In other words, it is listening on the conversations of the terrorists,
but not participating in the conversations themselves.
Imagine, for example, that a group of trained Americans enters a message
board or chat room known to be used by terrorists to recruit disaffected Iraqi or
Afghani youth. Rather than simply jot down what is being said, these officials
affirmatively join the conversation, discussing in Arabic and English, for
example, 1) the separation of powers scheme in the American constitutional
design that checks executive overreaching, 2) the freedoms accorded to
individuals, and the due process rights afforded to each person, and 3) the judicial
process which has led to decisions, such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld117 and
Boumediene v. Bush118, which ruled in favor of Muslim detainees and rejected
government arguments with respect to the legality of their own conduct, in order
to show that these principles are not just hollow promises of a just society. The
First Amendment’s protection of religious expression, which enjoys a special
place in the constellation of constitutional rights,119 may be particularly salient
with the Muslim community.
To the extent that there are individuals -- potential recruits -- unsure about
whether to side with the terrorists and take arms against the United States,
information on the American system of governance, its consideration of
individual rights, and its exercise of that system and consideration may convince
those individuals to resist the temptation to join opposition forces. The United
States is fighting an uphill battle in persuading individuals to reject the advances
of fellow, local Muslims. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the Americans to
116
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individual are made inviolate.”).

23

counter this attraction, to the degree it exists, with the American story because it
is through such attraction that the terrorists themselves recruit others.120 In the
push and pulls between clashing entities, who prevails in this information age
“may ultimately be about whose story wins,” notes two RAND experts.121
This approach provides the Americans with an additional tool in its post9/11 arsenal when the campaigns abroad have not yielded the desired results.
Moreover, it is consistent with the American view that “more speech” is
preferable to less speech. Some American legal minds, however, have doubted
whether American interests possess effective speech that may respond to or offset
the ideology of the terrorists. Judge Richard A. Posner, for example, states, “it is
unclear what counterarguments are available to opponents” of the rhetoric of
radical Muslim clerics.122 As I noted elsewhere, “Posner underestimates the
attractiveness of the fundamental principles of liberty and religious freedom that
form the intellectual foundation of the American republic. . . . American values
and ideals can resonate with the hearts and minds of all men and can
commensurately diminish the misguided intention to cripple the greatest
experiment in liberty and religious freedom ever known.”123
Relatedly, a substantive American faction on the Internet would unleash
an aspect of “soft power,” which has heretofore been a limited component of
American foreign policy, particularly with respect to dealing with terrorists.124
The Economist, for example, observed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that, in
compromising American ideals, the Bush administration was “blunting one of
America’s most powerful weapons against terrorism.”125
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“Soft power” consists of “the ability to get what you want” in terms of
foreign policy “through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”126 Harvard’s
Joseph S. Nye, who coined the phrase, explains that, “Seduction is always more
effective than [military or economic] coercion, and many values like democracy,
human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.”127
It is not only more effective, but “essential to winning the peace,” not just
“winning a war.”128 To prevail in the long-term, “you need to get others to buy in
to your values.”129 Soft power has had demonstrable success in the past -- it was
integral piece of the American victory in the Cold War. As one historian noted,
“However important the military power and political promise of the United States
were . . . , it was the American economic and cultural attraction that really won
over the hearts and minds of the majorities of young people for Western
democracy.”130
To be sure, soft power, as Nye admits, depends on having “willing
receivers,” or a captive audience.131 While hardcore fundamentalists may be out
of the reach of reason or reasonable debate, it is the moderates who the faction
would aim to persuade. “[T]he ability to attract the moderates is critical to
victory,” Nye adds.132 In order to effectively communicate with the moderates,
the contents of the information about the United States should be descriptive in
nature rather than comparative. If the information is perceived as an exercise in
arrogance or articulated in a tone of condescension, these efforts will repulse
moderates and be counterproductive.133
An American faction may yield additional, strategic benefits. Sharing
more information on the United States may not only help draw moderate Muslims
towards American purposes, but may also help generate a broader base of
international support for American policy initiatives, including the campaigns in
126
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Iraq and Afghanistan. In this respect, the American faction may naturally grow a
consensus as to its activities there.134
The feasibility of the American online faction is enhanced given the
current administration, which is more amenable to diplomacy and “soft power”
generally.135 In practice, the government could set up an independent office
charged with the responsibility to 1) detect online areas in which moderate Iraqis
and Afghanis frequent and which terrorists enter in order to remonstrate and
recruit moderates, 2) develop accurate information on the United States’ structure,
individual rights and liberties, and its faithful adherence to this structure and
individual guarantees, 3) translate this purely descriptive information into Arabic,
using a tone that is respectful, and extracted of any political spin or the hint of
superiority, and 4) directly enter these online areas identified in order to
disseminate this information.
Part of this office’s mission could be to convince the general public to
follow similar paths of spreading descriptive information on the majesty of the
procedural and substantive aspects of the American constitutional republic. In
this respect, the office can help shape social norms that see such role-playing as a
matter of patriotic or civic duty. For example, individuals who participate in
social networking sites or programs, such as Second Life, can disseminate
information in the United States as online ambassadors of the nation.
Congress can also play a role. For example, it can create tax-based
incentives for non-profit organizations to increase civic education in the United
States such that the citizens can be informed and effective actors on the Internet
stage, and to specifically form the sort of private online faction that join with the
government to responsibly combat and neutralize the electronic words of the
terrorists. In this fashion, the legal norms can be modified in order to reflect this
important policy initiative and element of foreign policy with respect to
transnational terrorism.
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CONCLUSION
The concept of faction is essential to understanding American political
theory and how the republic was able to survive in a politically diverse, expansive
territory. If Madison were to witness the current wartime climate, the success
with which the terrorists have occupied the web, and the commensurate absence
of a coordinated American faction, he may not be surprised that we may be losing
the battle for hearts and minds -- a necessary battle in the larger war on terrorists.
The sensible remedy would be to funnel the interests and passions of the
American people into a robust faction of ideas that can compete with the terrorists
in the digital frontier.
The truth of the matter is that the terrorists are using the Internet to
disseminate its ideology and to convince others to come under its banner, among
other things. The United States is tracking the online activities of the terrorists
but has failed to provide a counterbalance to the terrorist narrative that is taking
place in cyberspace. In a war that is becoming difficult to win, the United States
should utilize all the tools at its disposal, including entering the Internet as an
active participant in the conversation with the terrorists. The American script will
reflect the structure, rights and ideals that the United States believes not only in
principle but has demonstrated fidelity to in practice. If moderates susceptible to
the advances of al Qaeda are presented with an alternative -- one that describes in
honesty and with humility the fundamentals of American government -- the
moderates will be less likely to side with our enemies and take arms against
America and our interests. The expansive Internet, without any supervisory
control, enables this substantive American faction to enter and hopefully balance
the opposing viewpoint.
Given the disappointing state of the campaign against transnational
terrorism, discussing our values is a modest step in a war that threatens those
values themselves and the nation to which they belong.
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